

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 28 October, 1943 — File No. 23

(2)

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	report	Spot Report	10/28/73	B
2	telegram	Amemb Jidda to SecState	10/28/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE	NSC		BOX NUMBER	1176
FOLDER TITLE	(2)			

RESTRICTION CODES

- | | |
|--|--|
| A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. | E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. |
| B. National security classified information. | F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes. |
| C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights. | G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. |
| D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person. | H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. |



THE JOINT STAFF

TOP SECRET

WAR

N M C C

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

28 October 1973
0700 EST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Recapitulation of Airlift Deliveries to Israel

Listed below are data covering US airlift deliveries to Israel as of 0830Z 28 October 1973:

Totals for 24-Hour Periods Ending 0730Z on the Day Shown*	<u>Tonnages</u>			
	<u>22 Oct</u>	<u>23 Oct</u>	<u>24 Oct</u>	<u>25 Oct</u>
By Soviets	790-984	860-1116	380-528	20-40
By U.S. Mil	1013	1024	985	816
By El Al	197	54	176	15
	<u>26 Oct</u>	<u>27 Oct</u>	<u>28 Oct</u>	
By Soviets	340-480	410-564	330-456	
By U.S. Mil	867	858	846	
By El Al	212	370**	171	
Cumulative Totals*	<u>22 Oct</u>	<u>23 Oct</u>	<u>24 Oct</u>	<u>25 Oct</u>
By Soviets	8950-11328	9810-12444	10090-12852	10110-12876
By U.S. Mil	5896	6920	7905	8721
By U.S./El Al	1859	1913	2089	2104
	<u>26 Oct</u>	<u>27 Oct</u>	<u>28 Oct</u>	
By Soviets	10450-13356	10860-13920	11190-14376	
By U.S. Mil	9588	10446	11292	
By U.S./El Al	2316	2686**	2857	

* 0830Z commencing 28 Oct. Excluding aircraft delivered.

** Includes reconciliation of previously unreported tonnages.

Classified by DDO, NMCC
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11052
EXEMPTION CATEGORY XGDS-3

TOP SECRET DECLASSIFY ON _____ N/A

~~TOP SECRET~~

U.S. Aircraft Delivered

No.	Type	Date Delivered	Remarks
8	F-4E	14 Oct 73	
6	F-4E	15 Oct 73	
12	C-130B	15 Oct 73	
12	F-4E	17 Oct 73	
2	F-4E	18 Oct 73	
4	F-4E	20 Oct 73	
8	A-4	21 Oct 73	
10	A-4	22 Oct 73	
7	F-4	22 Oct 73	
1	F-4	23 Oct 73	Completes programmed F-4 delivery.
13	A-4	23 Oct 73	
5	A-4	24 Oct 73	
2	A-4	28 Oct 73	Completes programmed A-4 air delivery. Four A-4s in transit by ship. 12 A-4s in Norfolk awaiting sealift.

Sorties

Last 25 Hours***	Cumulative
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C-141	17	218
C-5	5	71
E1 A1	5	72

***Reflects time change

Charles K. Heiden

CHARLES K. HEIDEN
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for
Operations, NMCC

DISTRIBUTION:

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DJS
Mil Asst to SecDef
J-30
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

War

28 Oct

CONFIDENTIAL 931 - - - - -

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PAGE 01 USUN N 04267 280518Z

14
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00

CCO-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 1031 W
R 280428Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 570

099158

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELD _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 4267

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFDR UNSC XF
SUBJ: US AND USSR IN ME: UNTSO AND UNEF

REF: USUN 4260

1. SUMMARY: ACCCOMPANIED BY AMB. SCHAUFELE AND POLCOUNS, I AGAIN MET TONIGHT AFTER CLOSE OF SECURITY COUNCIL WITH SOVIET PERMREP MALIK, WHO ACCCOMPANIED BY SAFRONCHUK, OVINNIKOV AND GOLUBNICHYI. WE MOVED DISCUSSION OF US AND SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN UNTSO FORWARD BY A FEW NUMBERS BUT REACHED NO UNDERSTANDING ON STAFFING UNEF. END SUMMARY.

A-B

2. MALIK OPENED CONVERSATION BY SAYING USUN HAD FAILED TO REPORT THAT MALIK HAD LAST NIGHT PLUMPED FOR 70 SOVIET AND 70 AMERICANS IN UNTSO. DR. KISSINGER HAD SHOWN OUR TELEGRAM TO AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN WHO HAD NOTED THAT OMISSION. I TOLD MALIK WE WOULD CHANGE OUR NUMBER TONIGHT FROM 15-20 TO 25.

3. MALIK RESPONDED BY ASKING INTERPRETER TO READ FROM WHAT PURPORTED TO BE INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW. GIST OF INSTRUCTIONS WAS THAT US AND SOVIET OBSERVERS WOULD BE FULLY INTEGRATED INTO UNTSO "SO THAT TWO COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE SAME CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION FROM SAME PLACE." FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT COULD "TORPEDO UNDERSTANDING" NON EXISTING

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BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, DEVELOPMENT USSR WOULD LIKE
TO AVOID.

4. MALIK WENT ON TO CLAIM THAT NON-ALIGNED HAD SUPPORTED SOVIETS ON "EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION" ISSUE TODAY. NON-ALIGNED HAD STRESSED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THIS PRINCIPLE EXCEPT FOR THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. REPRESENTATIVES OF WESTERN STATES ALWAYS STRESS CONCEPT OF BALANCE. MALIK ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW UNTSO COULD BE MORE UNBALANCED IF THE TOTAL NATO PRESENCE, NOW NUMBERING 110, WERE INCREASED TO 135 AND THE SOVIETS WITH 25 OBSERVERS WERE ONLY WARSAW PACT MEMBERS. I TOLD MALIK THAT USG WANTED ME TO REACH FRIENDLY AGREEMENT WITH HIM, BUT THAT I WAS PRESENT SOLELY TO DEBATE NUMBER OF SOVIETS AND AMERICANS. I COULD NOT REPRESENT NATO. MALIK SAID THE MORE SOVIETS AND AMERICANS IN UNTSO THE BETTER. HE ALLEGED IN PASSING THAT THE THREE CONTINGENTS OF UNEF SENT FROM CYPRUS HAD BEEN HEADED BY A CANADIAN COLONEL--A NATO MAN. I INSISTED I COULD TALK ONLY ABOUT SOVIETS AND AMERICANS. US AND SOVIETS COULD NOT APPEAR TO DOMINATE UNTSO. ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM US PREPARED TO AGREE TO FOR UNTSO WOULD BE THAT OF LARGEST CONTINGENT NOW IN UNTSO. WE UNDERSTOOD SWEDES WERE MOST NUMBEROUS WITH 30. MALIK SAID HE WOULD TAKE NOT OF THIS PROPOSAL AND SUGGESTED WE BOTH BUCK QUESTION TO HIGHER LEVEL. (HE SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTED HIS RECORDS SHOWED NUMBER OF SWEDES IN UNTSO TO BE 36. OUR FILE SHOWS 32.)

5. TURNING TO UNEF, MALIK ASKED HOW MANY NATIONAL CONTINGENTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED. I SAID I KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THAT AND REGARDED IT AS SYG'S BUSINESS. MALIK AGAIN ALLUDED TO THE CANADIAN COLONEL FROM CYPRUS AND REFERRED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION, SO-CALLED WEAOIS (WESTERN EUROPEANS AND OTHERS) ALREADY HAD FOUR COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN UNEF: FINNS, SWEDES, AUSTRIANS AND CANADIANS. OBVIOUSLY, THERE SHOULD BE CONTINGENTS FROM FOUR SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES. I REPLIED US THOUGHT ONE ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLE NOW IMPORTANT: NO COUNTRY ACTIVELY HOSTILE TO ONE OF THE PARTIES SHOULD BE IN UNEF. MALIK LOOKED PAINED AND CALLED THIS "UN-FRIENDLY, COLD WAR-KIND OF APPROACH." I SAID I THOUGHT NON-



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ALIGNED IN SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT AGREE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE NO ONE IN UNEF WHO IS FROM COUNTRY THAT IS MEMBER OF ANY ALLIANCE. MALIK RECALLED TRIUMPHANTLY THAT I HAD PROPOSED NORWAY, A MEMBER OF NATO. I REMINDED HIM THAT I HAD ONLY MENTIONED NORWAY AS EUROPEAN COUNTRY MEETING OUR CRITERIA WHICH HAD ALREADY VOLUNTEERED CONTINGENT. MALIK AGAIN RAISED POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT ON POLAND AND NORWAY AS EAST-WEST PAIR AND SAID THAT, SINCE SYG HAS ALREADY PICKED THREE WEO'S, NEXT STEP WAS TO CHOOSE THREE COUNTRIES FROM "SOVIET GROUP."

6. WE SEEMED AT THIS POINT TO BE GETTING NOWHERE, AND MALIK READILY AGREED TO MY SUGGESTION THAT WE CALL IT A NIGHT.

7. AS WE LEFT BUILDING, MALIK REVERTED TO THEME HE HAD BEEN RIDING ALL DAY LONG--THAT U.S. HAD LEAKED ELEMENTS OF OUR PRECEDING MEETING THIS SUBJECT. WE, OF COURSE, DENIED ANY LEAKS. MALIK INSISTED ON STRICTEST PROTECTION PRIVACY TONIGHTS MEETING. WE AGREED.
SCALI

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War

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44
ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 IO-14 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00
INRE-00 USSS-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03
INR-10 L-03 NSA-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03
SS-20 ACDA-19 OMB-01 DRC-01 /135 W

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R 281433Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 310
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION USUN

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8714

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, XF, IS
SUBJECT: ALLON INTERVIEW OCTOBER 27

1. FOLLOWING IS FULL SUMMARY OF VERBATIM TRANSLATION BY
GOI PRESS OFFICE OF DEPUTY PRIMIN ALLON'S INTERVIEW ON
ISRAELI TELEVISION OCTOBER 27.

2. ALLON'S REPLY TO FIRST QUESTION WAS THAT WAR IS NOT
REALLY OVER, SO LONG AS EGYPT AND SYRIA ARE RECEIVING NEW

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WEAPONS AND CEASEFIRE NOT FULLY IN EFFECT. ASKED IF ISRAEL HAD WON WAR, ALLON SAID YES, COMPARING ARAB STATES' PREPARATIONS AND AIMS WITH PRESENT SITUATION.

3. PQ ANSWER TO THIRD QUESTION, ALLON SAID NO, AREA BALANCE OF FORCES HAS NOT CHANGED, ALTHOUGH MUTUAL ESTIMATIONS ON BOTH SIDES MAY HAVE CHANGED. IN PAST ISRAELIS TENDED TO DISMISS ARABS' STRENGTH. LEARNING THIS WAR'S LESSONS, ISRAEL WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE ABLE TO INCREASE ITS EDGE OVER ARABS.

4. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IN ALL ARAB-ISRAELI WARS, CEASEFIRES CAME EARLY FROM ISRAELI VIEWPOINT, ALLON SAID THIS CEASEFIRE NEVERTHELESS FOUND IDF IN FAVORABLE GEOGRAPHIC POSITION.

5. ASKED IF ISRAEL WOULD NOW BE SUBJECT TO PRESSURE, ALLON SAID THERE IS ISRAEL-EGYPT AND INTERNATIONAL ARGUMENT GOING ON ABOUT WHERE OCT 22 CEASEFIRE LINES WERE. IDF HAD IN FACT ENCIRCLED THIRD EGYPTIAN ARMY BEFORE CEASEFIRE BUT IMPROVED ENCIRCLEMENT AFTERWARDS WHEN PROVOKED BY EGYPTIANS. MOREOVER, "WE, I BELIEVE, CANNOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO GIVE UP ANY OF THE GAINS WE ACHIEVED AS LONG AS THE FIGHTING WAS CONDUCTED AT THE EGYPTIANS' INITIATIVE, AS IT ACTUALLY WAS." AT SAME TIME, ISRAEL IS PERMITTING HUMANITARIAN AID TO THIRD ARMY, AND DIRECT MILITARY CONTACT IS BEING CONSIDERED TO FACILITATE THIS.

6. ALLON REPLIED TO NEXT QUERY THAT ALTHOUGH IT WAS TRUE INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION HAD PRODUCED THIS MILITARY CONTACT, CONTACT WOULD BE DIRECT. ALLON HOPED MILITARY CONTACTS ABOUT CEASEFIRE WOULD DEVELOP INTO MILITARY-LEVEL TALKS ABOUT WHOLE MILITARY ASPECT, THESE TO BE FOLLOWED BY RESOLUTION 338 PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. NOT ANSWERING NBTT QUESTION DIRECTLY ABOUT WHETHER UNEF WOULD HINDER TALKS, ALLON REITERATED ISRKELI POSITION THAT UNEF SHOULD BE COMPRISED OF CONTINGENTS ONLY FROM STATES HAVING RELATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES.

7. ASKED IF PRESENT CEASEFIRE LINES WOULD REMAIN UNTIL

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PEACE IS ESTABLISHED, ALLON SAID LINES ARE GOOD MILITARILY FOR ISRAEL. BEGIN QUOTE "NEVERTHELESS, IN ORDER TO TRY AND CONSIDER THE NEEDS OF A TRANSITION PERIOD AND PARTICULARLY OUR OWN ASPIRATION EB GLZ TO THE STAGE OF PEACE TALKS, I WOULD NOT OPPOSE EVEN AT THE FIRST STAGE, EVEN AS A FIRST STEP IN CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, FOR THE ARMIES TO RETURN TO EITHER SIDE OF THE SUEZ CANAL AS THEY WERE BEFORE THE OUTBURST OF HOSTILITIES, THAT IS THAT THE EGYPTIANS RETURN TO THE WEST BANK AND ISRAEL RETURN TO THE EAST BANK, AND THAT THEY BE SEPARATED ON THE BANKS OF THE CANAL BY AN INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY FORCE, TO PREVENT FRICTION, INCIDENTS AND SHOOTING." END QUOTE

8. ASKED IF THIS WOULD BE GOOD FOR ISRAEL, HE SAID YES, AND ALSO FOR EGYPT. BEGIN QUOTE "FOR DESPITE THEIR GREAT MILITARY DEFEAT WE SEE THAT IN THE VERY PRESENCE OF EGYPTIAN FORCES THERE, EVEN IN A SITUATION OF ENCIRCLEMENT OR PARTIAL ENCIRCLEMENT, THEY CLAIM A KIND OF GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY WILL NOT WANT TO GIVE UP THIS PREFERENCE, SO AS TO PROVE TO THEIR PEOPLE AND TO OTHER ARAB NATIONS THAT THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN OVERCOMING THE "BARRIER OF FEAR" AS DEFINED BY MASSANIN HEIKAL, IN SUCCEEDING TO BUILD BROAD BRIDGEHEADS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CANAL. IF THIS PRESENCE MAKES IT EASIER FOR THEM TO FREE THEMSELVES OF THE INFERIORITY COMPLEX WHICH, UNFORTUNATELY, HAS ACCOMPANIED THEM, WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION, FOR SO MANY YEARS, AND IF IT MAKES IT EASIER FOR THEM TO COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, I WOULD BE WILLING FOR US TO RELATE TO THIS WITH SUFFICIENT TOLERANCE SO LONG AS WE DO GET TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. BUT THE PROPOSAL MUST BE MADE TO SIC THEM." END QUOTE.

9. ALLON ADDED SUCH PROPOSAL HAD NOT YET BEEN EXAMINED.

10. ALLON FIRMLY REJECTED SUGGESTION ISRAEL MAY BE BECOMING US SATELLITE. ISRAEL SOMETIMES COMPLIED WITH US PROPOSAL BECAUSE OF US APPEAL, SOMETIMES DID SO AFTER GETTING US TO

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44
ACTION NEA=12

INFO OCT=01 EUR=25 ID=14 ISO=00 SSO=00 NSCE=00 USIE=00
INRE=00 USSS=00 CCO=00 CIAE=00 DODE=00 PM=07 H=03
INR=10 L=03 NSAE=00 NSC=10 PA=04 RSC=01 PRS=01 SPC=03
SS=20 ACDA=19 OMB=01 DRC=01 /135 W

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O R 281435Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHD IMMEDIATE 0311
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS TEL AVIV SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8714

AMEND IT, AND SOMETIMES WAS OBLIGED TO AGREE WHEN ISRAEL
WOULD HAVE PREFERRED NOT TO HAVE BEEN ASKED. BUT THIS
WAS NOT THE CASE WITH OCT 22 CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL, WHICH
DID NOT LEAVE ISRAEL IN CONDITION OF STRATEGIC INFERIORITY.

11. ALLON REPLIED TO NEXT QUERY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO
IMPOSED SETTLEMENT, AS PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY HAD SAID
SO. ALSO, BEGIN QUOTE " SINCE THE US CONSIDERS ITSELF AN OFFICIAL
CANDIDATE FOR ONE OF THE APPROPRIATE AUSPICES FOR THE PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS, IT CANNOT WORK OUT PROGRAMS OF ITS OWN. AND
IF IT HAS NO PROGRAMS OF ITS OWN, HOW CAN IT IMPOSE NON-
EXISTENT PROGRAM?... BUT ... THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE GREAT
POWERS WILL TRY TO EXPLOIT THEIR INFLUENCE ON EACH OTHER...
AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, THEY SHOULD INFLUENCE EACH OTHER AND
THE PARTIES TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT TO MAKE MUTUAL

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CONCESSION." END QUOTE

12. ALLON AGREED WITH QUESTIONER THAT US AND USSR WILL NOT ALLOW CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THEMSELVES TO ARISE. ISRAEL WOULD NOT NEED DIRECT US MILITARY INTERVENTION AND IN FACT IS PROVIDING VALIDITY OF NIXON DOCTRINE. IF PARTIES REFUSE TO MAKE PEACE, POWERS CANNOT FORCE THEM TO. IF ARAB STATES DO NOT DRAW TRUE CONCLUSIONS AND MAKE PEACE, THEY WILL BE COMMITTING FATAL ERROR.

13. ALLON CONTINUED: BEGIN QUOTE " WHEN WE GET TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARA 3 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS REACHED A DECISION ON THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SIDES) TO ESTABLISH THE PEACE IN THE FUTURE ON THE BASIS OF FOUR POINTS:

A. DEFENSIBLE BORDERS;

B. EFFECTIVE MUTUAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING CERTAIN INSPECTED DEMILITARIZED ZONES;

C. A BALANCE OF FORCES BETWEEN THE SIDES TO THE DISPUTE;

D. PEACE TREATIES.

I BELIEVE THAT WITH FOUR POINTS SUCH AS THESE IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO CONSTITUTE A DURABLE PEACE. BUT IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT THIS WE MUST HAVE PERSISTENCE.". END QUOTE

14. ASKED IF RES 338 NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN SIGHT, ALLON SAID NOT YET, BUT CEASEFIRE ITSELF IS STILL BEING WORKED ON. AS LONG AS BAG-EL-MANDEB AND GULF OF SUEZ NAVIGATION IS BEING INTERFERED WITH, THERE IS NO CEASEFIRE.

14. ALLON, AGREEING END OF 1973 WAR HOLDS GREATER HOPE FOR PEACE THAN 1967 WAR ENDING, SAID ISRAELIS NOW HAVE LEARNED ARABS ARE READY TO RISK STARTING WAR "EVEN IF IT IS WAR OF DESPERATION (WHICH) MANY PEOPLE FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT." ARABS HAVE LEARNED THERE CAN BE NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO ARAB -ISRAELI CONFLICT, AND HAVE MOVED CONFLICT FROM DEADLOCK TO SUPER-POWER NEGOTIATIONS-- WHICH HAD BEEN ARAB OBJECTIVE. EGYPTIANS PLACE MOST OF THEIR HOPE IN US, KNOWING USSR HAS NO INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL. BUT ARABS KNOW THERE IS NO MILITARY

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SOLUTION AND ISRAEL DID NOT WAGE WAR WITH BRITISH OR FRENCH ASSISTANCE AND DID NOT TAKE ARABS BY SURPRISE. THEY CANNOT RATIONALIZE THEIR DEFEAT, NOR CAN THEY BLAME THEIR WEAPONS.

15. ASKED WHAT ISRAEL WILL PROPOSE, ALLON REPLIED RES 338 PARA 3 TALKS, PLUS POW EXCHANGE. HE NOTED THAT EVEN IF CEASEFIRE IS FULLY IMPLEMENTED, "INCLUDING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE SUEZ," ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN LARGELY MOBILIZED FOR WEEKS OR MONTHS, MEANING MUCH WORK AND SACRIFICE ON HOME FRONT. BUT BEGIN QUOTE "PERHAPS THIS TIME THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE HAS MORE OF A CHANCE THAN IN THE PAST. PERHAPS THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IT HAS MORE OF A CHANCE SINCE ALORIN WHEN WE LOST A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICAL ACTION. BUT I DOD NOT WANT TO SPREAD ILLUSION; IN MY OPINION WE ARE STILL WALKING IN A LONG TUNNEL, EXCEPT THAT, I AM HAPPY TO SAY, WE CAN NOW SEE THE LIGHT AT THE FAR END." END QUOTE

16. ASKED ABOUT LESSONS FROM THIS WAR, ALLON SAID THERE ARE MANY, AND IN DUE COURSE THEY WILL BE DISCUSSED. QUERIED IF OLD ALLON PLAN STANDS, HE ANSWERED HE MIGHT INTRODUCE CERTAIN CHANGES, BUT IN PRINCIPLE, IT STANDS. HIS OPINION HAD NOT CHANGED THAT ISRAEL MUST HAVE DEFENSIBLE BORDERS AND MUST BE PRIMARILY JEWISH IN POPULATION. ALLON ADDED THAT 1973 WAR PROVED THAT STRATEGIC DEPTH AND STRONG IDF ARE NEEDED BY ISRAEL, BUT IT ALSO PRIVED THAT BEGIN QUOTE "THOSE WHO DISMISS THE ARABS OUT OF HAND WERE LIKEWISE WRONG. THE TRUTH IS THAT WE MUST BASE OUR POLICY UPON PEACE TREATIES AND UPON MILITARY BALANCE." END QUOTE.

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SECRET 014

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44
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 1031 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/CE:RWBECKER:HC
APPROVED BY EUR-GSSPRINGSTEEN
EUR/CE-NCLEDSKY
DOD/TSA-MR. BLITGEN
NEA TASK FORCE - MR. WILEY
S/S-MR. GAMMON

① 0281746Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 212635

EXDIS

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, GW
SUBJECT: MOVEMENT OF US MILITARY MATERIEL FROM FRG
REF: BONN 15529; STATE 212618

⑥ 100755

RR

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLINE _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SORNENFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
VALSH _____

1. IN LIGHT OF REPRESENTATION MADE BY SECRETARY TO FRG AMBASSADOR VON STADEN IN WASHINGTON OCTOBER 26 (SEPTEL), YOU SHOULD SEEK AN APPOINTMENT AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN FONOFF MONDAY TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE QUESTION OF ARMS RESUPPLY TO ISRAEL FROM STOCKS IN GERMANY.

2. YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT IN RESPONDING TO THE SECRETARY, FRG AMBASSADOR VON STADEN INDICATED THAT THE PRIMARY FRG OBJECTION TO THE RESUPPLY EFFORT HAD BEEN THE UTILIZATION OF ISRAELI SHIPS AS THE MEANS OF TRANSPORT. VON STADEN OFFERED NO SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF US SHIPS OR PLANES AND, WE ASSUME, TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF FLAG VESSELS OF NON-BELLIGERANTS. WE BELIEVE, THEREFORE, ON BASIS OF HIS RESPONSE THAT THE CHARTER AND USE OF NON-ISRAELI SHIPS WITH NON-ISRAELI CREWS WOULD BE PERMITTED, AND WE WISH TO PROCEED ON THIS BASIS. (FYI WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE



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PAGE 02 STATE 212635


COMPROMISE OF LIBERIAN VESSEL WITH ISRAELI CREW OFFERED
REFTEL WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO FRG, END FYI)

3. YOU SHOULD ALSO ADVISE FONOFF THAT WE ASSUME THERE
WILL BE NO OBJECTION TO THE CONTINUED USE OF USG VESSELS
AND PLANES TO TRANSPORT SUPPLIES TO THE MIDDLE EAST. KISSINGER

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED

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28 OCT

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ORIGIN SS=30

INFO OCT=01 150=00 220=00 550=00 NSCE=00 INRE=00 CIAE=00
NSAE=00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY DOD/ISA:LT COLPIANKA/J=3/COLMANION
APPROVED BY NEA = ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.
DOD/METG = MR. BLITGEN
S/S = MR. PICKERING (SUBS)
S/S=0 = MR. WRIGHT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC
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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 11652 = GDS
TAGS: OVIP, IS
SUBJECT: U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT VALIDATION TEAM,
ISRAEL (USMEVTI) VISIT TO ISRAEL (U)

1. (S) IT IS PLANNED THAT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WILL DISPATCH A TEAM TO ISRAEL FOR THE PURPOSE OF VALIDATING LOGISTIC LOSSES AND TO ESTIMATE ISRAELI REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT CAPABILITIES. ADDITIONALLY, INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVES ASSIGNED TO THE TEAM DESIRE TO REVIEW

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ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORNATS _____
JORDEN _____

KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
O'DEEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENTALDT _____
V.I.G. _____
VALSH _____

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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WITH ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ESTIMATES OF ARAB LOSSES.

2. (S) THE USMEVTI, TO BE HEADED BY A GENERAL OFFICER FROM THE JOINT STAFF, WILL BE COMPOSED OF 18 TO 25 REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SERVICES, THE JOINT STAFF, AND DIA. NAMES, SECURITY CLEARANCES AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE PASSED BY THE JCS TO THE USDAO TEL-AVIV BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

3. (C) PENDING COUNTRY CLEARANCE IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE TEAM WILL ARRIVE IN TEL-AVIV SOMETIME BETWEEN 29 - 30 OCTOBER AND REMAIN FROM 10 TO 14 DAYS OR AS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THEIR TASK.

4. (S) REQUEST THAT YOU APPROACH GOI FOR APPROVAL USMEVTI VISIT, STRESSING IT IS IMPORTANT TO EXPEDITIOUS CARRYING OUT OF US RESUPPLY EFFORT. FURTHER REQUEST YOU IMPRESS UPON GOI NECESSITY FOR TEAM TO MAKE ON-SITE ASSESSMENT OF LOSSES RATHER THAN TO RELY ON BRIEFINGS AND REPORTS. KISSINGER

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ACTION SS-30

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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5191

EXDIS *Rumsfeld upset with*

SECSTATE PASS *(S) SECDEF FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION ALSO, TAKE FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION*

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12/31/81
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
SUBJ: THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

ANDERSON _____
BONDURE _____
HORNIGS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODERN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONSON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SCHNEIDER _____
WILLIAMS _____
WALISH _____

D/E ⑥

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HP

SUMMARY: THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WHILE BEING SUCCESSFULLY EASED, HAS LED TO MUTUAL RECRIMINATION - PUBLIC AS WELL AS PRIVATE - WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WHICH, IF NOT DEFESCALATED, COULD DO SERIOUS AND POSSIBLY LASTING DAMAGE TO U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE AND THE VARIOUS NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE EUROPEAN NATIONS TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST AND TOWARDS INTERESTS IN THE REGION DIFFER. THE US, VIEWING THE CRISIS AS AN EAST-WEST COMPETITION THREATENING DETENTE, ASSERTED THAT SECURITY AND DETENTE WERE INDIVISIBLE; WHILE THERE IS NO EUROPEAN VIEW AS SUCH, SOME EUROPEAN ALLIES SEEING THE CONFLICT AS THE LATEST RESURGENCE OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI STRUGGLE AND ANXIOUS ABOUT OIL SUPPLIES, WERE NOT FULLY PERSUADED OF THE US VIEW OF THE FULL GLOBAL ASPECT OF THE SOVIET THREAT. IN THOSE CASES, EITHER THEY WERE UNABLE TO GRASP IT, OR THEY LACKED THE INFORMATION NECESSARY TO SEE IT AS WE DID. CLEARLY SOME WERE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE US INTERPRETATION



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
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ON FAITH ALONE. BY CEASING TO CRITICIZE THE BEHAVIOR OF THE ALLIES, IN A WAY THAT SUGGESTS THEY ARE A MONOLITH - WHICH THEY ARE NOT-, BY UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL REALITIES FACED BY A NUMBER OF INSECURE BUT FRIENDLY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, AND BY PROVIDING A PERSUASIVE EXPLANATION OF US ACTIONS, WE CAN BUILD GREATER COHESION IN SUPPORT OF PRESENT AND FUTURE US ACTIONS. ACTION REQUESTED: INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE EARLY THIS WEEK. END SUMMARY.

1. AS A RESULT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, AND DESPITE THE SUCCESS OF U.S. ACTION THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES ARE IN A SITUATION WHERE EACH SIDE IS DECLARING ITSELF THE VICTIM OF SHABBY TREATMENT. FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, AND WITH ADMITTEDLY INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, IT APPEARS THAT THE PROBLEM BEGAN WITH DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF ALLIANCE AND NATIONAL INTERESTS RELATED TO THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING THE PROBLEM OF OIL SUPPLIES. IT WAS FED, FROM THEIR STANDPOINT, BY FACT THAT US DID NOT SUPPLY RESPONSES TO THEIR MANY QUESTIONS AND REQUESTS; AND FROM OURS, BY WHAT WE SAW AS THEIR UNRESPONSIVENESS. IT WAS IGNITED BY THEIR IRRITATION AND POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT ON THE LACK OF NOTIFICATION OF THE ALERT OF US FORCES ON THEIR SOIL, UNTIL MANY HOURS AFTER IT WAS PUBLICLY KNOWN. THE US HAS NOT EMPLOYED THE ALLIANCE CONSULTATION PROCESS TO BEST EFFECT TO PROVIDE TIMELY NOTIFICATION, TO EXPLAIN ITS POLICIES PERSUASIVELY AND RESPONSIVELY, TO BUILD ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICIES AND TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR FURTHER US INITIATIVES REGARDING THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. IF MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS CONTINUE AND FURTHER EXACERBATE RELATIONS AND SOLIDARITY AMONG THE ALLIES, THERE CAN BE SERIOUS AND POSSIBLY LASTING DAMAGE TO US INTERESTS IN EUROPE. NOT THE LEAST OF THE DANGERS IS THAT THE SITUATION PRESENTS OPTIONS FOR THE USSR TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF INJURED NATIONAL FEELINGS IN WESTERN EUROPE, OF THE COALESCING EFFECT AGAINST THE US OF THE RECENT US BLANKET CRITICISM OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND OF THE APPREHENSION CAUSED BY THE US ANNOUNCEMENT OF A REASSESSMENT. USING ELEMENTS UNFRIENDLY TO THE US AND NATO IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES AS A CAT'S-PAW, THEY MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO AGAIN EMPLOY SIMILAR ADVENTURIST TACTICS.

3. TOP ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN HAVE PUBLICLY RECORDED THE DISPLEASURE OF OUR GOVERNMENT WITH THE CONDUCT OF OUR ALLIES DURING THE CURRENT CRISIS. I AM UNAWARE OF EXPLICIT US BILATERAL



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
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REQUESTS TO ITS ALLIES TO ADOPT OR REFRAIN FROM TAKING SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION. THERE WAS, AS WASHINGTON WILL HAVE NOTED, A POSITIVE GENERAL RESPONSE TO THE GENERAL REQUESTS THE US MADE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL. SPECIFICALLY, WHEN WE ASKED OUR ALLIES TO POINT OUT TO THE SOVIETS THE DANGERS TO DETENTE STEMMING FROM SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SEVERAL ALLIES SO BEFORE BEING ASKED.

4. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT OUR ALLIES HAVE REPEATEDLY PRESSED ME FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT OUR POLICIES AND ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH THEY MIGHT RELAY TO THEIR CAPITALS TO CONVINCE THEIR GOVERNMENTS OF THE CORRECTNESS OF THE US JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER. THE ALLIES (WITH THE ALMOST SOLITARY EXCEPTION OF FRANCE) ARE NOT UNWILLING TO FOLLOW THE US LEAD; BUT THEIR GOVERNMENTS REQUIRE THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR OUR POLICIES BUTTRESSED BY SOME FACTS WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO REACH DECISIONS AND TAKE ACTIONS THAT THEIR POLITICAL LEADERS CAN THEN JUSTIFY TO THEIR OWN PARLIAMENTS, THEIR FREE PRESSES, AND THEIR VOTERS.

5. I PROPOSE THAT WE NOW BEGIN TO RESTORE THE UTILITY OF THE ALLIANCE AS A TOOL OF US POLICY. AS A FIRST STEP, ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN SHOULD NO LONGER LEVEL CRITICISM AT "EUROPEAN ALLIES" OR "NATO ALLIES" AS THOUGH THEY WERE A UNIT. OUR ALLIES ARE FOR THE MOST PART SMALL INDIVIDUAL NATION STATES WHOSE POLICIES AND BEHAVIOR VARIED WIDELY IN RECENT WEEKS, AND EACH IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO DIFFERENT PRESSURES AND INDUCEMENTS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND ITS CORRIDORS. I WOULD SUGGEST CONFIDENTIAL DIPLOMATIC MOVES AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY AND PERHAPS THE ONLY WAY TO DEAL WITH US CRITICISM OF THE BEHAVIOR OF RELUCTANT ALLIES. CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT APPROACH COULD INDUCE SEVERAL ALLIES TO DRIFT TOWARDS FRENCH POSITION.



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ACTION SS-30

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 5191

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SECSTATE PASS SECDEF FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION ALSO TAKE FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION

6. I ASK THAT THE DEPARTMENT PROVIDE THE RELEVANT INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED AND CURRENT FACTS AND RATIONALE THAT WILL ENABLE ME TO EXPLAIN THE COUNCIL US ACTIONS DURING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, AND WHY THEY WARRANT SOLID ALLIED SUPPORT. (SEE USNATO 5184, 5179, 5133, 5049, AND 5038). SEVERAL ALLIES, BUT MOST INSISTENTLY FRANCE, HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR BILATERAL DEALINGS WITH THE USSR, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. THESE QUESTIONS ARE NOT GOING TO GO AWAY. THE US SHOULD IN COUNCIL PFOVIDE SOME ANSWER TO THOSE QUESTIONS. FURTHER, ANY SPECIFIC INFORMATION WHICH CAN BE USED WITH SPECIFIC NATIONS WOULD BE HELPFUL.

7. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, NO ONE CAN DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE US WILL ASK ITS ALLIES FOR FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS OF SOLIDARITY WITH REGARD TO THE MIDDLE EAST. THE US SHOULD NOW CREATE THE BASIS FOR SUCH LATER REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT. WHENEVER THE US COMES TO THE COUNCIL AND SERIOUSLY EXPECTS TO RECEIVE SUPPORT FOR ITS REQUESTS, IT SHOULD ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE ON A

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TIMELY BASIS: 1) A CLEAR STATEMENT OF US POLICY OBJECTIVES;
2) SOME FACTUAL DATA; 3) SOME OF THE ANALYSIS THAT LED US TO
ADOPT A GIVEN COURSE OF ACTION; 4) A PRECISE DESCRIPTION OF
WHAT WE EXPECT THE ALLIES TO DO SINGLY AND/OR COLLECTIVELY, -- WHY,
AND WITHIN WHAT LIMITS.

8. I REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS FOR USF EARLY THIS WEEK (COUNCIL
MEETINGS, MONDAY OCTOBER 29 AND WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 31). RUMSFELD

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WAR
28 Oct
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ACTION NEA-12

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E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR EG IS
SUBJECT: HEYKAL ON ISRAELI PENETRATION OF WEST BANK

1. OCTOBER 28 AHRAM CARRIES EXCEPTIONAL ARTICLE BY HEYKAL EXPLAINING CAUSES AND MEANING OF ISRAELI PENETRATION OF EGYPTIAN WEST BANK. POINT OF ARTICLE IS THAT (A) INTELLIGENCE FROM US SR-71 FLIGHTS OF OCTOBER 13 WAS PASSED TO ISRAELIS AND SHOWED THEM WEAKEST POINT OF EGYPTIAN LINE ON EAST BANK OF CANAL. ISRAELI PENETRATION BEGAN NIGHT OF OCTOBER 15 IN FORM OF "COMMANDO TANKS" OPERATING IN ISOLATED FASHION; (B) OVER PERIOD OF ONE WEEK, ISRAELIS WERE ABLE TO MOVE IN SMALL GROUPS DOWN TOWARD SOUTH END OF BITTER LAKE ON WEST BANK, BUT NOT IN GREAT FORCE; (C) MOST OF ISRAELI GAINS ON WEST BANK OCCURRED AFTER OCTOBER 22 CEASEFIRE; (D) EGYPTIAN MILITARY SITUATION IS STILL GOOD, AND ISRAELI FORCE ON WEST BANK CONSIST OF ONLY SOME "GUERRILLA TANKS," WITHOUT CONCENTRATION OR DEPTH, WHILE EGYPTIAN ARMY MAINTAINS HOLD OF LARGE PARTS OF SINAI.

2. COMMENT: HEYKAL'S ARTICLE IS HIGHLY DETAILED AND IS ACCOMPANIED BY TWO MAPS SHOWING ISRAELI FORCES MOVING ACROSS CANAL LIKE SOME MALIGNANT BUT CONTAINABLE DISEASE.

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ARTICLE AIMS AT MINIMIZING SERIOUSNESS OF IDF PENETRATION,
AND SUGGESTS THAT IT WAS NOT CAUSED BY ANY EGYPTIAN
DEFICIENCY. TO ACHIEVE LAST PURPOSE, HEYKAL FOCUSSES ON US
AS POWER WHICH PROVIDED ISRAEL WITH NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE
TO BREAK EGYPTIAN LINE.

3. RELATED DEVELOPMENT IS NOTED IN OCTOBER 28 CAIRO PRESS
THAT GOE HAS ASKED TURKISH GOVERNMENT FOR REASONS WHY TURKISH
AIR BASES ARE BEING USED BY US RECONNAISSANCE PLANES THAT
SPY ON EGYPT.

SMITH

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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 5018
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S E C R E T STATE 212621

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E.O. 11652 - XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO THE KING FROM THE SECRETARY

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN FROM THE SECRETARY.

2. QUOTE: WE WOULD LIKE HIS MAJESTY TO KNOW THAT WE HAVE HAD A FURTHER SERIES OF INTENSIVE EXCHANGES DURING THE NIGHT AND THIS MORNING WITH THE EGYPTIANS, ISRAELIS AND SOVIETS REGARDING THE PROBLEM OF THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY EAST OF THE CANAL.

3. AS A RESULT OF OUR EFFORTS, THE ISRAELIS OFFERED TO SEND A SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO MEET WITH AN EGYPTIAN COUNTERPART WITH A VIEW TO WORKING OUT THE DETAILS ON HOW THE MILITARY PARTS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 338 AND 339 CAN BE CARRIED OUT.

4. AS PART OF THE ABOVE, THE ISRAELIS HAVE INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW ONE CONVOY THROUGH TO EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY WITH NON-MILITARY SUPPLIES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS.

5. EGYPT HAS AGREED TO THE ABOVE PROPOSAL.

6. WE HAVE ALSO SOUGHT AND RECEIVED THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT THAT THE ABOVE MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE PRESENCE OF UN REPRESENTATIVE AT MIDNIGHT CAIRO TIME TODAY, OCTOBER 27. UNQUOTE. KISSINGER
BT

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APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
CLEARANCES S/S MR GAMMON S/S-O MR WRIGHT

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